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Abstract
Efforts to maintain balanced budgets lead to substantial pro-cyclicality in states’
capital investments, transfers to local governments, and spending in areas like
education and transportation. Reliance on volatile revenue sources predicts rel-
atively severe volatility in these expenditures. States with strict balanced budget
requirements must restore fiscal balance faster than those without, leading to
rescissions during years in which they face unexpected shocks. I find that these
rescissions occur disproportionately in areas with readily deferred projects. Evi-
dence points to the relative strength of public sector union groups as a driver of
variation in the composition of mid-year rescissions across states.
1 Introduction
This paper investigates patterns in discretionary spending by state governments
over the business cycle.1 Discretionary spending encompasses the main components
of state budgets that do not behave as automatic stabilizers. It includes spending on
infrastructure and capital equipment, the financing of government service provision,
and transfers to local governments (e.g., for education). In response to economic
downturns, discretionary spending does not automatically fall like own-source rev-
enues or rise like payouts through unemployment insurance and low-income enti-
tlement programs. Instead, the level of discretionary spending is set by the annual
1A moderate degree of pro-cyclicality in total and capital spending has previously been docu-
mented in work by Sorensen, Wu, and Yosha (2001) and Fata´s and Mihov (2006), but the distinction
between discretionary spending and mandatory entitlement programs does not appear to have been
pursued.
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(or, in some states, biennial) appropriations choices of state legislatures. Given the
behavior of automatic stabilizers, balanced budget requirements will constrain this
spending to move pro-cyclically unless states save significantly during economic ex-
pansions.2
I find that discretionary spending exhibits a high degree of pro-cyclicality. On
average across U.S. states from 1960 to 2006, a $1 deviation in income from trend
predicts an 8 cent deviation in discretionary spending from trend. These fluctuations
imply a spending elasticity of -0.8 with respect to the size of a state’s economy.
As noted in previous work (Clemens and Miran, 2012), it is difficult to rational-
ize this pro-cyclical spending on infrastructure, equipment, and service provision as
serving a welfare-enhancing purpose. The consumption of public services, for ex-
ample, would generate greater utility if these services flowed smoothly. Similarly,
if capital expenditures must be conducted with any cyclical orientation at all, they
would ideally be reserved for downturns as a source of “shovel ready” projects. In-
frastructure and equipment will also tend to be more expensive during booms, when
construction wages and prices more generally will be high due to high demand, than
during recessions.3
My analysis focuses on the predictors of cross-state differences in three features
2Consistent with recent work by Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2011), balanced budget rules
operate as highly relevant constraints on deficit running by sub-national governments.
3This paper focuses on the development of facts describing the pro-cyclicality of states’ expen-
ditures, leaving the task of quantifying the costs of this behavior for future work. Recent work on
the fiscal policy multipliers associated with sub-national government spending, including papers by
Clemens and Miran (2012), Shoag (2010), Chodorow-Reich, Feiveson, Liscow, and Woolston (2012),
Serrato and Wingender (2010), and Wilson (2012) can be viewed as efforts to quantify the effect of the
relevant types of spending on the macro economy.
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of states’ discretionary spending: the degree of its pro-cyclicality, the pace of ad-
justments at the beginning of downturns, and the composition of the adjustments at
both the beginnings of downturns and over the full course of the business cycle. I
show first that pro-cyclicality is a significant feature of nearly all major technical (e.g,
capital, current, and intergovernmental) and functional (e.g., education, health, and
transportation) categories of spending. Spending on health, which can in practice
be closely tied to safety-net spending, is a notable exception. Spending in all other
categories adjusts roughly in proportion to the size of the economy; the elasticity of
spending with respect to the size of a state’s economy tends to be close to 1.4
I next identify two empirically important predictors of volatility in discretionary
spending. Tax revenues exhibit greater pro-cyclicality than other state government
revenue sources, with the personal income tax exhibiting greater volatility than other
forms of tax revenue (Follette, Kusko, and Lutz, 2009). I show that reliance on rela-
tively volatile revenue sources translates into greater pro-cyclicality in discretionary
spending.5 This result holds strongly for capital, current, and intergovernmental
expenditures and has significant economic implications. The estimates imply that
states in the first quartile of reliance on taxation have discretionary spending that is
half as volatile as those in the top quartile.
4The parameter estimated is similar in spirit to the “policy elasticity” parameter estimated in
two papers by Fatas and Mihov (Fata´s and Mihov, 2003, 2006), who study fiscal policy both across
countries and across US states.
5Over a sample extending from 1978 to 1994, Sorensen, Wu, and Yosha (2001) found relatively
little evidence that differences in states’ tax bases predicted differences in the cyclicality of total state
spending. Their exercise difference from the exercise conducted here in several ways: it covered
a briefer sample period, focused on total state spending rather than discretionary spending, and
focused on differences in the composition of states’ tax revenues rather than on tax revenues as a
share of total state revenues.
4
The length of state budgetary cycles emerges as a predictor of the volatility of
discretionary capital spending. Capital expenditures exhibit almost no cyclicality in
states with both biennial budgetary and biennial legislative cycles. In other states,
capital expenditures exhibit even greater volatility than other categories of spending.
Longer budgetary and legislative cycles may help states smooth their infrastructure
investments and equipment purchases. State differences in a second fiscal institu-
tion of interest, namely the stringency of their balanced budget requirements, has
little power for predicting the pro-cyclicality of spending over the full course of the
business cycle.
I next move to an investigation of the mid-year budget cuts made by states at
the beginnings of recessions. Poterba (1994) shows that, consistent with compli-
ance with their strict balanced budget requirements, states with restrictions on the
maintenance (i.e., the ”carrying over”) of short-term, general obligation debt enact
substantial mid-year budget cuts (or budgetary rescissions) in the face of unexpected
fiscal shocks. Clemens and Miran (2012) extend Poterba’s results and show that the
fiscal shocks of interest occur just as states’ economies turn down from their expan-
sionary peaks.
I begin this phase of the analysis by estimating the extent to which claimed budget
cuts translate into reductions in observed levels of spending. While states do, on
average, appear to enact cuts as claimed, the estimated relationship between budget
cuts and total discretionary spending lacks precision. The lack of power likely reflects
the moderate size of the relevant fiscal shocks and measurement error inherent in
their construction. It may also reflect significant variation in the extent to which
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states reduce their budgets as claimed.
I then investigate the composition of the realized reductions in spending. Re-
alized cuts are disproportionately concentrated in categories that are relatively de-
ferrable (e.g., capital expenditures and spending in categories like Utilities, which is
dominated by spending associated with the maintenance of public transit systems,
power plants, and water infrastructure). Conditional on having to make mid-year
rescissions, states attempt to limit disruptions to the flow of public services.
Finally, I investigate the extent to which interest groups influence different aspects
of the budget cutting process. I find evidence that when relatively strong public-
sector unions are associated with a category of spending, that category largely avoids
mid-year budgetary rescissions.6 I find no evidence that strong unions reduce the
total quantity of budget cuts enacted. Rather, the relative strength of union groups
drives the distribution of a fixed quantity of rescissions. Avoided mid-year rescis-
sions do not extend into the next year’s appropriations cycle. At the beginnings
of recessions, unions thus appear to exert more significant influence over mid-year
budget cuts (which take place outside of the usual appropriations process) than over
appropriations. The results are suggestive regarding the relative influence of unions
over governors (who play significant roles in the process of allocating rescissions)
and legislatures.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I investigate the degree of
spending pro-cyclicality across states and budgetary categories from 1960 to 2006.
6The result is quite consistent with recent work by Feiveson (2011), who finds that unions played
an important role in driving the use of windfall funds associated with the federal revenue sharing
program run from 1972 to 1986.
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In section 3 I present a strategy for investigating the composition of the mid-year
rescissions induced by strict balanced budget requirements. In section 4 I describe
the data used to construct the variables of interest for this portion of the analysis. In
section 5 I present the results and in section 6 I conclude.
2 The Cyclicality of Discretionary Spending
In this section I examine the relationship between de-trended, state-level personal
income and discretionary spending by state governments. The personal income data
come from the Regional Accounts of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), while
the spending data come from the Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of State Govern-
ment Finances (ASSGF). After converting all series into real dollars per capita, I take
residuals from regressions of the following form:
Zs,t = β0,sδs + β1,sδs × trendt + β2,sδs × trend2t
+ β3,sδs × trend3t + β4,sδs × trend4t + eZs,t. (1)
Zs,t is either personal income or a category of government spending (expressed in
either levels or logs with observations at the level of state fiscal years), δs is a state-
specific indicator variable, trend is set equal to 1 for the first year of the sample, and
the es,t are the desired residuals. The sample runs from 1960 to 2006 and includes all
states but Alaska. Summary statistics for the various categories of spending can be
found in Table 1.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Fiscal Variables: 1960-2006 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Economic Variables ($ per capita) 
    Personal Income 23659 6475 
Technical Budgetary Categories ($ per capita) 
    Total Non Welfare Expenditures 2101 781 
  Non-Welfare Capital 337 152 
  Non-Welfare Current 1003 498 
  Intergovernmental Grants 818 395 
   Direct Spending in Major Functional Categories ($ per capita) 
    Education 484 241 
  Health and Hospitals 183 97 
  Highways 299 139 
  Other 375 274 
   Features of Fiscal Landscape 
    Total Tax Share of Revenues 0.56 0.06 
  Personal Income Tax Share of Revenues 0.13 0.08 
  Biennial Budgetary and Legislative Cycle 0.21 0.41 
  Weak Balanced Budget Requirements 0.27 0.44 
Note: The table contains summary statistics for state-level economic and fiscal variables expressed 
from 1960 to 2006 for all US states but Alaska.  Personal income data come from the Bureaa of 
Economic Analysis while the fiscal variables come from that Annual Survey of State Government 
Finances.  Data on state budgeting cycles come from Snell (2010).  Data on state balanced budget 
requirements come from ACIR (1987).  Total Non Welfare Direct Expenditures is constructed as the 
sum of Capital, Current, and Intergovernmental expenditures net of capital and current expenditures 
on public welfare programs.  Capital and Current spending similarly net out public welfare spending.  
The Other category is the residual of Total Non Welfare Direct Expenditures minus spending on 
Education, Health and Hospitals, and Highways.  Direct spending in the major functional categories 
sums to the total of the Capital and Current expenditures presented above.  Direct state spending on 
education consists almost exclusively of higher education, as elementary and secondary education are 
financed through intergovernmental grants.  Other consists primarily of expenses related to 
government administration. 
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I examine the relationship between de-trended income and the de-trended spend-
ing variables. This involves regressions of the form
eGs,t = β0 + β1e
I
s,t + µs,t (2)
as well as regressions of the form
eGs,t − eGs,t−j = γ0 + γj[eIs,t − eIs,t−j] + µs,t (3)
with j = 1, 2, or 3. β1 is an estimate of the extent to which discretionary spending
takes a pro-cyclical stance over the full course of the business cycle. Estimates of γj
reveal the timing with which spending responds to changes in income. Estimates
using levels provide a sense for the absolute size of states’ cyclical adjustments. Es-
timates using logs provide evidence regarding the elasticity of expenditures with
respect to the size of the economy.
Figures 1 and 2 provide graphical evidence, previously reported by Clemens and
Miran (2012), on the cyclicality of states’ discretionary spending. Both figures involve
residuals from estimates of equation (1) for personal income and for the aggregate of
spending outside of public welfare programs. Figure 1 plots the means (taken across
states) of these residuals in each year from 1960 to 2006. Figure 2 displays each state-
by-year observation for the series of residuals in scatter plot form. The timing of the
cyclical adjustments in state spending (as illustrated in Figure 1) is consistent with
what one would expect due to balanced budget requirements. Spending tracks the
business cycle with a lag of one to two years. The best-fit line in Figure 2 implies
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Figure 1: De-trended Non Safety-Net Outlays and Personal Income: Means Across
States (1960-2006). The figure plots the unweighted means (across states) of de-
trended personal income and state government spending outside of insurance trusts
and safety-net programs on a per capita basis. Detrending was conducted using
state-specific quartic polynomials. Personal income data come from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) and state government spending data come from the Cen-
sus of Governments (COG). This figure was originally published in Clemens and
Miran (2012).
that when personal income is $1 below trend, discretionary spending tends to be 7.8
cents below trend (with a standard error of 1.7 cents). These fluctuations imply a
spending elasticity of -0.8 with respect to the size of a state’s economy.
Table 2 displays estimates of equations (2) and (3) across the major budgetary
categories. These include technical categories, where Non Welfare Capital, Non Wel-
fare Current, and Intergovernmental expenditures sum to Total Non Public Welfare
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Figure 2: De-trended Non Safety-Net Outlays and Personal Income (1960-2006).
The figure plots state-year observations of de-trended personal income and state
government spending outside of insurance trusts and safety-net programs on a per
capita basis. The best-fit line has a slope of 0.078 (standard error of 0.017). Detrend-
ing was conducted using state-specific quartic polynomials. Personal income data
come from the BEA and state government spending data come from the COG. This
figure was originally published in Clemens and Miran (2012).
expenditures, and functional categories, where Education, Health, Highways, and
Other sum to the total of Non Welfare Capital and Non Welfare Current expendi-
tures. The results in Panel A were estimated with all variables expressed in real
dollars per capita. The first row shows that when state income is one dollar below
trend, total non welfare spending tends to be 7.8 cents below trend, with capital
expenditures 2.1 cents below trend, current expenditures 2 cents below trend, and
intergovernmental expenditures 2.4 cents below trend. Expenditures on education
11
and highways move pro-cyclically, while spending on health does not have a strong
cyclical orientation in either direction.
The second row of results, which displays estimates involving first differences of
the de-trended income and spending series, provides a sense for how quickly cyclical
adjustments take place. The aggregate of discretionary spending falls by roughly 4
cents for each dollar decline in income relative to trend. Declines in current and
intergovernmental expenditures quickly track the business cycle, while the decline
in capital expenditures is relatively small during the initial year in which income
declines. The third row of results displays estimates using three-year differences of
the de-trended income and spending series. Almost all of the pro-cyclicality apparent
in the initial row of results is apparent in the three-year differences.7
The results in Panel B involve regressions of the same form as those in Panel
A, but with variables expresses in logs. These estimates capture the elasticity of
spending with respect to the size of the economy. The results show which spending
categories fluctuate to greater or lesser degrees over the course of the business cycle.
Although adjustments in capital spending do not take place as rapidly as adjust-
ments in other categories, capital spending emerges as having the most pro-cyclical
stance over the full course of the business cycle. Consistent with this finding, capital-
intensive spending on highways exhibits greater pro-cyclicality than other functional
categories.
7The presentation of one and three year differences allows for comparison with results presented
by Sorensen, Wu, and Yosha (2001). Estimates regarding the cyclicality of capital expenditures are
some of the only directly comparable results, and the results are quite similar (see Sorenson, Wu and
Yosha’s Table 7). The significant difference between our estimates for the cyclicality of total expen-
ditures reflects my focus on spending outside of mandatory entitlement programs, which fluctuate
counter-cyclically.
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Tables 3 and 4 explore the extent to which differences in states’ fiscal institu-
tions predict differences in the cyclicality of their discretionary spending. Table 3
focuses on the relationship between cyclicality and the use of taxation as a source
of revenue. Tax revenues are more volatile than other sources of state government
revenue, which are dominated by intergovernmental revenues, a variety of charges
(including student tuition payments) and user fees, and revenues generated from
states’ natural resources. Among the important sources of state tax revenue, per-
sonal income taxes are more volatile than sales taxes. The results in Tables 3 involve
estimates of the following forms:
eGs,t = β0 + β1e
I
s,t + β2TaxSharese
I
s,t + µs,t (4)
and
eGs,t − eGs,t−j = γ0 + γ1,j[eIs,t − eIs,t−j] + γ2,jTaxShares[eIs,t − eIs,t−j] + µs,t (5)
where for each state s, the tax share variable is calculated as
TaxShares =∑
t
Taxess,t
Revenuess,t
−∑
t
∑
s
Taxess,t
Revenuess,t
. (6)
Subtraction of the global mean allows the coefficient β1 to be interpreted as an esti-
mate of the degree of cyclicality for a state with the mean level of reliance on taxation.
When constructed using all taxes as a share of revenue, TaxShares has a mean of 0.0
and a standard deviation of 0.06. When constructed using personal income taxes as
a share of revenue, it has a mean of 0.0 and a standard deviation of 0.08.
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State reliance on taxation strongly predicts the degree of pro-cyclicality in discre-
tionary spending. The magnitude of the differences in cyclicality across high and
low tax states is substantial. Estimates of equations (4) and (5) appear in Table 3.
They imply that states in the first quartile of reliance on taxation tend to have spend-
ing about half as volatile as those in the top quartile. At the extremes, states at
the bottom of the tax-reliance distribution exhibit one sixth of the cyclicality of the
most tax-reliant states. These differences in the cyclicality of expenditures almost
perfectly match the associated differences in the cyclicality of revenues across states
(results not shown). The relatively severe pro-cyclicality of spending in tax-reliant
states pervades across capital, current, and intergovernmental expenditures.8
Results in Table 4 expand on equations (4) and (5) by allowing two measures of
states’ fiscal institutions to mediate the cyclicality of state expenditures (in addition
to reliance on taxation). The first fiscal institution is the length of the budgetary cycle.
While a slim majority of states budget and legislate on an annual basis, others do so
once every two years. Some states budget biennially while legislating annually and
others both legislate and budget on two year cycles (Snell, 2010). The specifications
reported in Table 4 include an interaction between deviations in income from trend
and an indicator for states that both budget and legislate biennially.9 States also vary
8One implication of this finding relates to the tendency of taxation to be more progressive than
alternative sources of revenue. Progressive taxation provides a form of social insurance at a point in
time. When states fail to save for recessions, however, it also results in relatively severe fiscal stress,
requiring cuts to discretionary programs. If these cuts extend to the social safety net, the choice of
revenue instruments may involve a trade-off between point-in-time progressivity and the performance
of social insurance programs over the course of the business cycle.
9States that budget biennially and legislate annually ultimately exhibit the same cyclical patterns
as states the budget on an annual basis (results not shown). The frequency of state budgeting and
legislative sessions is not constant over time. I acquired information on changes in these frequen-
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Table 4: Association Between Three Fiscal Institutions and the Degree of Pro-Cyclicality 
across Expenditure Categories: 1960-2006 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spending Category: Total Non Public Welfare Capital Current Intergov  
Logs Dependent Variable: εGs,t  
εIs,t  0.960*** 1.806*** 0.735*** 0.965*** 
 
(0.154) (0.395) (0.116) (0.180) 
εIs,t *TaxShares 5.763*** 8.106** 4.734*** 7.234*** 
  [mean = 0.00, sd = 0.06] (1.673) (3.087) (1.395) (2.424) 
εIs,t *Biennials,t -0.277 -1.512*** -0.00801 0.221 
 
(0.231) (0.452) (0.219) (0.268) 
εIs,t *WeakRuless 0.150 0.468 0.127 -0.257 
 
(0.247) (0.609) (0.174) (0.400) 
     
 
Dependent Variable: εGs,t - εGs,t-j 
εIs,t - εIs,t-1 0.557*** 0.516** 0.450*** 0.686*** 
 
(0.0907) (0.214) (0.0820) (0.120) 
[εIs,t - εIs,t-1]*TaxShares 4.189*** 5.289*** 3.000*** 4.247** 
  [mean = 0.00, sd = 0.06] (0.660) (1.946) (0.597) (1.982) 
[εIs,t - εIs,t-1]*Biennials,t -0.100 -0.495* -0.0165 0.146 
 
(0.107) (0.255) (0.107) (0.235) 
[εIs,t - εIs,t-1]*WeakRuless 0.0302 0.176 0.177 -0.179 
 
(0.149) (0.435) (0.106) (0.345) 
 
 
 
  
εIs,t - εIs,t-3 0.873*** 1.239*** 0.740*** 0.893*** 
 
(0.117) (0.266) (0.0935) (0.150) 
[εIs,t - εIs,t-3]*TaxShares 4.068*** 5.162** 3.371*** 4.637** 
  [mean = 0.00, sd = 0.06] (1.245) (2.545) (1.113) (1.868) 
[εIs,t - εIs,t-3]*Biennials,t -0.230 -0.924** -0.0837 0.112 
 
(0.199) (0.364) (0.213) (0.243) 
[εIs,t - εIs,t-3]*WeakRuless 0.208 0.503 0.0946 0.0878 
 
(0.213) (0.477) (0.176) (0.326) 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels respectively.  Standard errors, calculated 
allowing for arbitrary correlation at the state level, are in parentheses beneath each point estimate.  The sample includes all 
states but Alaska for the years 1960-2006.    The de-trended variables εGs,t and εIs,t, as well as the tax share variable, are 
constructed as described in the note to Table 2.  Biennial is an indicator for states that are operating on biennial budgetary and 
legislative cycles, with the data taken from Snell (2010).  WeakRules is an indicator for a state with weak balanced budget 
requirements as reported by ACIR (1987).  The table presents three sets of regressions, each involving four rows of 
coefficients, one for the main effect of the relevant income variable and the others containing separate interaction between the 
income variable and the tax share variable, the indicator for biennial cycles, and the indicator for weak balanced budget rules.   
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in terms of the stringency of their balanced budget requirements. The specifications
in Table 4 include an interaction between deviations in income from trend and an
indicator for states with relatively weak budget rules. I hold off on a detailed expla-
nation of the budget rule variable until the following sections, where these rules take
center stage.
The results show that reliance on taxation is far more predictive of the cyclicality
of discretionary spending than the fiscal institutions. Biennial budgeting emerges as
an important predictor of the cyclicality of capital, but not other, expenditures. States
that budget and legislate biennially have a-cyclical capital expenditures while states
that either budget or legislate annually exhibit substantial pro-cyclicality. Smooth
budgeting of capital projects thus appears to be facilitated by budgeting over a rela-
tively long time horizon.
Budget rules do not strongly predict the cyclicality of spending over the full
course of the business cycle. The next section shows that budget rules do play a
role in shaping how fast states respond to the unexpected shocks that occur at the
beginnings of recessions. The results in Table 4 are driven by the fact that states with
weak budget rules also expose themselves to large shocks through extensive reliance
on personal income taxation.10
cies from Snell (2010), which is available through the website for the National Conference of State
Legislators: http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=12658.
10States with weak budget rules appear to have moderately more pro-cyclical expenditures than
states with strict rules in specifications that do not include the interaction between deviations in
income from trend and the measures of states’ reliance on tax revenues (results not shown). This
result highlights why, although many of the results in this section are highly suggestive and point to
important effects of state’ fiscal choices, I avoid interpreting the coefficients as unbiased estimates of
causal relationships.
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3 Estimating the Composition of Mid-Year Rescissions
The previous section focused on the adjustments made by states over the full
course of the business cycle. In this section my focus shifts towards the budget
cuts made by states at the beginnings of economic downturns. The analysis decom-
poses the mid-year budget cuts made by states with relatively strict balanced budget
requirements when they are faced with unexpected fiscal shocks. An interesting fea-
ture of these budget cuts is that they take place outside of the normal appropriations
process. While state legislatures dominate the normal appropriations process, state
governors take a leading role in shaping mid-year rescissions in response to revenue
shortfalls (Snell, 2010).
I use a measure of fiscal shocks (De f shocks,t), popularized by Poterba (1994),
which has two key features.11 First, it is driven by deviations in actual revenues and
expenditures from their forecasts. Second, it accounts for the mid-year actions taken
by states to narrow emerging deficits. The deficit shock experienced by a state is the
difference between the shocks to its expenditures and revenues (De f icit Shockt =
Expenditure Shockt − Revenue Shockt.), which are constructed as described below:
Expenditure Shockt = OutlayCL,t − Et−1(Outlays,t)
Revenue Shockt = RevenueCL,t − Et−1(Revenues,t)
The terms involving expectations are outlay and revenue forecasts, where the fore-
cast is made at the end of the previous fiscal year. OutlayCL,t and RevenueCL,t are
11The discussion in the remainder of this sub-section quotes liberally from joint work with Stephen
Miran (Clemens and Miran, 2012).
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the constant-law levels of outlays and revenues; they are what would prevail in the
absence of mid-year adjustments to the budget. The difference between these terms
provides a true measure of expenditure and revenue shocks.12 One cannot directly
observe constant-law outlays and revenues. However, they can be recovered by sub-
tracting mid-year changes (denoted as 4Outlayst and 4Revenuet) from the final
outlay and revenue realizations for the fiscal year (Outlayst and Revenuet).
When states experience adverse fiscal shocks, they respond by enacting mid-year
budget cuts and tax increases. States with strict balanced budget requirements (to be
defined in detail in the following section) enact significantly more rescissions than
other states (Poterba, 1994; Clemens and Miran, 2012). I investigate the extent to
which this rule-induced differential in rescissions translates into observably lower
levels of expenditures, with further analysis of the composition of the cuts that are
made. This translates into the two-stage estimation strategy outlined below:13
12The use of constant-law measures is crucial because mid-year adjustments to outlays and rev-
enues will tend to undo the appearance of fiscal shocks. Were mid-year adjustments to be complete,
for example, realized deficits would always equal zero when states enter the fiscal year expecting the
budget to balance.
13Poterba clarifies an important point regarding what might look like a simultaneity problem in
the first-stage regressions due to the appearance of 4Outlayss,t in the construction of the deficit
shock (1994, pp. 809-810). In fact, a true simultaneity problem would result from failing to subtract
4Outlayss,t. As Poterba notes, if one did not subtract 4Outlayss,t, the resulting measure of the
shock would equal the true measure of the shock plus 4Outlayss,t. Hence regressing 4Outlayss,t on
this incorrect measure would amount to regressing it on itself plus a random variable. Subtracting
4Outlayss,t yields an estimate of the true shock and eliminates the simultaneity problem. That said,
it should be noted that classical measurement error in 4Outlayss,t would tend to bias the coefficient
on the deficit shock towards 1 under these circumstances rather than towards 0 as in the usual case.
20
̂4Outlayss,t = β1weakBBRs × De f shocks,t × 1De f shock>0
+ β2weakBBRs × De f shocks,t × 1De f shock≤0
+ β3De f shocks,t × 1De f shock>0 + β4De f shocks,t × 1De f shock≤0
+ β5,s × δs + β6,t × δt + β7,s × trendt × δs (7)
Gs,t = γ1 ̂4Outlayss,t
+ γ2De f shocks,t × 1De f shock>0 + γ3De f shocks,t × 1De f shock≤0
+ γ4,s × δs + γ5,t × δt + γ6,s × trendt × δs + es,t. (8)
Since the budget rules only bind when deficit shocks are positive (i.e., adverse),
I always incorporate the deficit shocks by introducing separate variables for their
positive and negative values; failure to do so would constitute a misspecification
of the model. In these equations, Gs,t measures state government expenditures for
state s during fiscal year t in a set of budgetary categories similar to, but slightly
more detailed than, that analyzed in section 2.14 4Outlayss,t is the within-fiscal-year
spending adjustment (or rescission), weakBBRs is an indicator equal to one if a state
has weak balanced budget rules, and De f shocks,t is the measure of deficit shocks.
The δs and δt terms represent state and year dummy variables. The specification is
designed so that the primary coefficient of interest, γ1, has the following interpreta-
14Summary statistics for these categories of spending from 1988-2004 can be found in Table 6.
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tion: in a given spending category G, there are γ1 cents in budget cuts for each total
dollar in reported mid-year rescissions.
After investigating the composition of budget cuts across the full set of states in
the sample, I expand the specification to investigate the possibility that public-sector
unions drive variation in the composition of budget cuts across states. I do this
through a straightforward modification to the specification described by equations
(7) and (8). The modification involves interacting the deficit shock variables (both
the main effects and the interactions with the indicator for weak budget rules) and
4Outlayss,t with an indicator for the presence of a strong union associated with a
particular spending category. These specifications involve two first-stage regressions,
one for predicting the main effect of 4Outlayss,t and the second for predicting the
interaction between 4Outlayss,t and the union indicator. I describe the construction
of the union variable in the following section.
4 Data
The binding constraint for constructing the measure of deficit shocks is the avail-
ability of data on mid-year rescissions and tax increases, which begins in 1988. I
have constructed these shocks for the years 1988 through 2004. Several state-year
observations are missing due to unreported or otherwise problematic data on one of
the inputs required for constructing the shocks.
The sample of states builds up from the base of 27 annually budgeting states
used by Poterba (1994). As Poterba notes, the annually budgeting states are the
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states for which strict balanced budget requirements have the clearest implications.
I have found that states with biennial budgetary cycles and annual legislative cycles
respond similarly to fiscal shocks as states with annual budgetary cycles.15 Conse-
quently, I expand the sample to include such states, excluding only states with both
biennial budgetary and biennial legislative cycles on the basis of their budgeting
systems. The sample thus includes 40 states, which can be found in Table 5.
4.1 Budget Rules
State balanced budget requirements play a central role in the estimation frame-
work.16 I collect information on balanced budget requirements from a 1987 report
by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) and from var-
ious reports by the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO). Rules
can be differentiated in large part on the basis of whether they affect the enactment
or execution of a state’s budget. An example of a rule that applies to the budget’s
enactment is a rule requiring the legislature to pass a balanced budget. Such a rule
does not force states to respond quickly to deficits that emerge over the course of the
fiscal year. It requires only that the budget be balanced (in expectation) in the fol-
lowing fiscal year, i.e., that E(Gt + 1) ≤ E(Tt + 1). Stricter rules apply more directly
to the execution of the budget. The strictest rule (also known as the ”No-Carry” rule)
prohibits carrying deficits through the next budget cycle. This rule requires that if
15This was also the case for the adjustments over the full course of the business cycle as investigated
in Section 2.
16The discussion in this sub-section quotes liberally from joint work with Stephen Miran (Clemens
and Miran, 2012).
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 Table 5: List of States by Budget Rule Classification 
Weak Rules 
 
Strong Rules 
CALIFORNIA 
 
ALABAMA MISSOURI 
CONNECTICUT 
 
ARIZONA NEBRASKA 
ILLINOIS 
 
COLORADO NEW JERSEY 
LOUISIANA 
 
DELAWARE NEW MEXICO 
MARYLAND 
 
FLORIDA OKLAHOMA 
MICHIGAN 
 
GEORGIA OHIO 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
 
HAWAII RHODE ISLAND 
NEW YORK 
 
IDAHO SOUTH CAROLINA 
PENNSYLVANIA  
 
INDIANA SOUTH DAKOTA 
WISCONSIN 
 
IOWA TENNESSEE 
VERMONT 
 
KANSAS UTAH 
  
MAINE VIRGINIA 
  
MINNESOTA WASHINGTON 
  
MISSISSIPPI WEST VIRGINIA 
   
WYOMING 
Note: The table contains a classification of the 40 states with annual legislative cycles that are included in 
the analysis presented in Tables 6 through 10.  This sample builds from the sample of 27 annually 
budgeting states analyzed by Poterba (1994) and by Clemens and Miran (2011) by adding the 13 states that 
operate with biennial budgetary cycles and annual legislative cycles.   States were coded according to a 
stringency index found in Table 3 of ACIR (1987).  States with an index value < 7 are classified as weak 
>= 7 as strong.  The index value of 7 is the threshold separating states that do and do not allow deficits 
from previous fiscal years to be carrier through the current fiscal year (i.e., the no carry over rule). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a deficit is incurred at time t, the budget for the following year must be such that
De f icitt + E(Gt + 1) ≤ E(Tt + 1).17
I generate the measure of budget rules using a 1 to 10 index produced by the
Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations (1987). I designate the 11 states
with scores less than 7 as “weak-rule” states. This is the cutoff associated with the
17Past research has explored some of the consequences of these rules. Notable studies include
work by Poterba (1997) and Bohn and Inman (1996), who examine the impact of different require-
ments on a broad range of budgetary outcomes. Highlights also include Poterba and Rueben (2001)
and Lowry (2001), whose work addresses the nexus between balanced budget requirements, state
fiscal behavior, and interest rates on general-obligation debt. These studies confirm empirically that
requirements which apply to the budget’s execution have greater impact than those that apply only
to the budget’s enactment. Strict budget rules are associated with lower spending levels, modestly
greater accumulation of surpluses in budget stabilization funds, and faster adjustment in response to
fiscal shocks.
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relatively crucial distinction between states with and without a rule that approxi-
mates the No-Carry rule.18 Table 5 categorizes the 40 states in the sample by their
classification as having weak or strong budget rules.
4.2 Deficit Shocks
The construction of the measure of deficit shocks was described in the previous
section. Here I present evidence similar to that presented by Clemens and Miran
(2012), but for a larger sample of states, regarding the timing of deficit shocks with
respect to the business cycle. Figure 3 graphs national means (across the states) of
deficit shocks and de-trended personal income per capita from 1988 to 2004. The
figure shows that deficit shocks become large when a state’s economy enters a re-
cession. When de-trended personal income turns sharply downward, large, positive
deficit shocks occur. Deficit shocks tended to be small and negative during the ex-
pansionary years of the mid- and late-1990s. The adverse shocks experienced at the
beginnings of recessions and the favorable shocks experienced during expansions
result in a mean shock that is fairly close to 0. Because deficit shocks occur close to
18In addition to the ACIR and NASBO classifications of budget rules, a classification can also be
found in a 1993 report by GAO. Differences between these classification systems are the subject of an
exchange between Levinson and Krol and Svorny (Levinson, 1998; Krol and Svorny, 2007; Levinson,
2007). An alternative classification scheme, based on direct readings of statutes and constitutions
across states, has also been recently produced by Hou and Smith (2006). The literature points towards
the notion that state political culture may ultimately be as important as the actual content of the
requirements themselves Hou and Smith (2006). We focus on the ACIR classification system because
of its power for predicting state’s mid-year budget cuts. This is another case in which we would
devote more time and space to robustness analysis if we were ultimately pushing a particular estimate
of the multiplier on state government spending. Given that we have not settled on an estimate of
the multiplier, however, we note only that robustness analyses along these lines, coupled with a
compelling justification for the baseline specification, are crucial components of analyses that rely on
particular schemes for classifying budget rules.
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Figure 3: Detrended Income and Deficit Shocks. The figure graphs deficit shocks
per capita and de-trended personal income per capita. The deficit shocks were con-
structed using data from semi-annual reports by the National Association of State
Budget Officers (NASBO). Personal income data come from the BEA.
the peak of a state’s business-cycle, they are negatively correlated with changes in
personal income and positively correlated with the level of personal income.
4.3 Measures of Public-Sector Worker Organizations
My measure of public-sector worker organizations uses the 1987 Census of Gov-
ernments. Unfortunately, the Census of Governments stopped collecting information
on the extent of worker organizations after 1987. Nonetheless, the 1987 data provide
a baseline look at these organizations in the year immediately before the sample
begins. I begin by constructing the fraction of full time workers in each category
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who are reported as being organized. Table 6 presents summary statistics for these
worker-organization rates. The means range from 32% for Education to 55% for
Highways and the distributions reveal significant variation within each functional
category across states. Note that since direct state spending on education primarily
involves higher education, the relevant education workers are university employ-
ees rather than elementary and secondary teachers and administrators. Highway
workers include workers involved in road maintenance (including, e.g., snow and
ice removal), toll booth workers, and operators of bridges and ferries). The “Other”
category is dominated by government administration and workers involved with
mass transit, which the census considers a utility rather than a component of high-
way/transportation spending.
Worker-organization rates tend to correlate highly across groups within states,
with the exception of the residual “Other” category. In results not shown I found
that absolute rates of unionization do not affect the total quantity of cuts from state
budgets in the face of fiscal shocks. The presented analysis thus focuses on the effect
of relative rates of public worker organization (within a state) on the composition of
the budget cuts enacted. The analysis involves a binary indicator of strong union
status, which I construct as follows. For each category of workers, I calculate the
fraction of workers organized in their “own” category and in “all other” categories.
I then rank states on the basis of the difference between these “own” and “all other”
fractions. Finally, I categorize the top half of states according to this (relative) mea-
sure as having a strong union associated with the spending category in question.
The measure is constructed such that a) half of the states are categorized as having a
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Table 6: Summary Statistics for Fiscal Variables: 1987-2004 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Deficit Shocks and Rescissions ($ per capita) 
     All States in Sample 
       ∆OUTLAYS 429 -19 33 
    DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK > 0} 429 42 69 
    DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK <= 0} 429 -28 53 
  Strong Budget Rule States 
       DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK > 0}  313 37 66 
    DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK <= 0} 313 -31 53 
  Weak Budget Rule States 
       DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK > 0} 116 55 75 
    DEFSHOCK*1{DEFSHOCK <= 0} 116 -20 51 
Broad Budget Categories ($ per capita) 
     Non Welfare Current and Capital 429 1721 583 
    Non-Welfare Current 429 1384 474 
    Non-Welfare Capital 429 337 152 
  Total Capital 429 341 157 
    Non-Construction Capital 429 71 47 
Major Functional Categories ($ per capita) 
     Education 429 601 243 
  Health and Hospitals 429 245 100 
  Highways 429 287 125 
  Law Enforcement 429 136 51 
  Other 429 394 281 
    Utilities 429 35 87 
    Non-Utilities Other 429 359 258 
Major Functions  (Unionization Rates) 
     Education 
 
0.46 0.34 
  Health and Hospitals 
 
0.44 0.29 
  Law Enforcement 
 
0.51 0.32 
  Highways 
 
0.55 0.28 
  Other 
 
0.59 0.34 
Note: The 429 observations in the table correspond to the observations for the years 1988-1994 and 2001-2004 for the 40 
states presented in Table 5.  The selection of years is driven by results presented in Table 7 and discussed in the text.  The 
∆OUTLAYS variable contains the mid-year budgetary rescissions reported by the National Association of State Budget 
Officers (NASBO).  The DEFSHOCK variables are constructed using information on budget forecasts, state budget 
realizations, mid-year rescissions, and mid-year tax changes, with the final variable constructed as described in the text.  All 
of these data are taken from semi-annual reports by NASBO.  State spending across categories is defined as reported in 
Table 1 with one exception: the Other category from Table 1 has been divided into Law Enforcement and Other, with 
Utilities also being broken out of the Other category for purposes of the analysis repoted in Table 8.  Information on 
unionization rates for public sector workers comes from the 1987 Census of Governments.  Law Enforcement consists 
primarily of the corrections budget.  Utilities include publicly own electric, gas, and water facilities and infrastructure as well 
as publicly owned mass transit systems. 
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(relatively) strong union for each spending category, and b) each state is categorized
as having a strong union in 2 or 3 of the 5 spending categories.
4.4 Description of Fiscal Variables
The first section of Table 6 contains summary statistics for the deficit shocks and
mid-year rescissions. The mid-year outlay changes in the sample averaged $19 per
capita, with some observations exceeding $200. The variable equal to the deficit
shock times an indicator for positive deficit shocks has a mean of $42 per capita
including the zeroes and $78 excluding them. The variable equal to the deficit shock
times an indicator for negative deficit shocks has a mean of -$28 per capita including
the zeroes and -$59 excluding the zeroes.
Over the period in the sample, deficit shocks tended to be a bit larger in weak-
rule states than in strong rule states, with mean positive deficit shocks of $55 in the
former and $37 in the latter. This is likely driven by the relatively extensive reliance
of states with weak budget rules on personal income taxation. Estimation concerns
associated with the impact of differences in states’ tax bases on their deficit shocks
led me to check the robustness of all results to controlling for interactions between
the deficit shock variables and the share of each states’ revenues that come from taxes
(results not shown). The inclusion of these controls does not substantively impact
the results.
In this portion of the study, which only uses data from 1988 through 2004, I am
able to break expenditures on Law Enforcement (primarily the corrections budget)
out from the Other category from section 2. The breakdown of functional categories
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into Education, Health, Highways, Law Enforcement, and Other is convenient as this
can be matched with the information on public worker organizations from the 1987
Census of Governments. These are direct expenditures by state governments and do
not include intergovernmental grants from state governments to local governments.
Consequently, the Education category, which accounts for the largest share of non-
welfare spending (slightly more than 1/3), primarily reflects spending on institutions
of higher education as opposed to elementary and secondary education. Addition-
ally, the Health category does not include payments related to Medicaid, which are
categorized as public welfare expenditures.
5 Results
5.1 First Stage Regressions
Table 7 presents results describing the behavior of state governments in the face
of unexpected fiscal shocks from 1988 through 2004. The table breaks the sample
down into three periods, with 1988-1994 representing an initial period during which
states experienced significant fiscal stress, 1995-2000 representing an expansionary
period during which states experienced few positive deficit shocks, and 2001-2004
representing a second period of fiscal stress. The difference between the behavior of
states with strict and weak budget rules is striking. From 1988 to 1994, strong-rule
states enacted an average of 50 cents in budget cuts per dollar of deficit shock, while
30
weak-rule states enacted an average of only 10 cents in such cuts.19 From 2001 to
2004, strong-rule states enacted an average of 34 cents in budget cuts per dollar of
deficit shock, while weak-rule states enacted essentially no cuts.
Differences between estimates for the expansionary period versus the two periods
of fiscal stress are substantial. Deficit shocks are generally un-predictive of state gov-
ernments’ mid-year actions during the 1995-2000 expansion. The point estimates for
this period are not statistically distinguishable from zero and the interaction between
budget rules and positive deficit shocks yields an economically large, wrong signed,
and highly imprecisely estimated coefficient. The imprecision is driven by the fact
that there are very few observations involving positive deficit shocks in states with
weak budget rules during this period. These were also years when states were more
likely to have surpluses left over from prior years, making it possible for them to
balance their budgets with smaller mid-year spending reductions and tax increases.
The measurement of deficit shocks may also be more error prone during expansion-
ary years due to the absence of reporting on mid-year spending increases.20 For
some combination of these reasons, the budget rules lack predictive power during
the expansionary period. Consequently, I focus solely on the periods of fiscal stress
in my effort to decompose these cuts across budgetary categories. Most of the spec-
19This first result is quite close to being a replication of results reported by Poterba (1994), who
studied the period extending from 1988 to 1992.
20This reflects some combination of institutional realities and measurement error. The rules for
changing appropriations in response to adverse shocks differ from those for changing appropriations
in response to favorable shocks. Increases in appropriations require legislation. In the face of un-
expected deficits, however, many state governors are constitutionally empowered to impose budget
cuts unilaterally. Hence while the variable is indeed right-censored, the degree to which this reflects
measurement error is unclear.
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ifications presented below use the specification in column 4 as their first stage. In
column 4 the two periods of fiscal stress are simply stacked together. This is done
fairly literally in the sense that, to assist with second-stage precision (which is gen-
erally in short supply), separate sets of state fixed effects and trends are included for
each period of fiscal stress.21
5.2 Second Stage Results
Table 8 presents relatively detailed breakdowns of the impact of mid-year rescis-
sions on spending across categories. All entries in the table correspond to point
estimates and standard errors for γ1 the coefficient on 4Outlays from equation (7).
In the first row I explore the distribution of budget cuts across the technical spend-
ing categories, where the sum of the non welfare current and capital expenditures
in columns 2 and 3 add to the aggregate of non welfare current and capital expen-
ditures from column 1. Cuts across these broad spending categories are not very
precisely estimated. The point estimate of 1.1 in column 1 suggests that, on average,
a dollar in budget cuts reported to NASBO does indeed correspond to a $1 reduc-
tion in discretionary spending. The standard error of roughly 0.6 reflects low power
driven by some combination of the moderate size of the shocks used to generate
variation, measurement error, and genuinely high variance in the behavior of states
that claim to rescind $1 in spending. The numbers in brackets beneath the point
estimates and standard errors correspond to each spending category’s share of to-
21Estimation with a single set of state fixed effects and state-specific trends for the full sample
period yields results that are qualitatively similar, but even less precisely estimated.
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tal non welfare capital and current expenditures. The point estimates suggest that
spending cuts are disproportionately loaded onto capital spending, and in particular
onto capital spending outside of construction projects (which largely corresponds
to maintenance and equipment purchases). Mid-year rescissions at the beginnings
of recessions follow a pattern similar to that of spending adjustments over the full
course of the business cycle, where capital expenditures exhibited greater cyclicality
than other expenditures.22
In rows 2 and 3, I break discretionary spending into its functional categories.
Rescissions appear across the board, with a disproportionately small share falling
on Education and a disproportionately large share falling on the residual Other cat-
egory. When I break this residual down into Utilities and Non-Utilities (primarily
governmental administration), it becomes apparent that Utilities, in particular, bear
a disproportionately large share of rescissions.
The results suggest that, in general, spending categories associated with lumpy,
one-time commitments bear a disproportionate share of rescissions. I further illus-
trate this phenomenon in Figure 4. To produce Figure 4 I divided the aggregate of
Non Welfare Current and Capital spending into 12 categories, namely the current
and capital accounts of Education, Health, Highways, Law Enforcement, Utilities,
and the remainder. For each category I then estimated the coefficient γ1 as for Table
7, then scaled them so that a coefficient of 1 would correspond to a rescission ex-
actly in proportion to a category’s share of the total. I then plotted each category’s
scaled γ1 against its coefficient of variation (CV), which I calculated within states
22Recall from Section 2 that this was particularly true of states that have either annual budgetary
or annual legislative cycles, which are the only states in the sample used for this section’s analysis.
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Figure 4: Outlay Changes and Coefficients of Variation. Y-axis values are coeffi-
cients estimated in the same manner as the estimates presented in Table 7, but taken
separately for the capital and current accounts of spending on education, health,
highways, law enforcement, utilities, and other, with each coefficient scaled by the
inverse of its share of the total spending outside of insurance trusts and safety-net
programs. The x-axis values are the coefficients of variations (CVs) for each spending
category, with CVs calculated for each state over time, then averaged across states.
over time, then averaged across states. The positive correlation between the rescis-
sion coefficients and CVs confirms that rescissions fall disproportionately on spend-
ing categories characterized by significant variation within states across time.23 The
figure changes little if the spending variables are de-trended prior to construction of
23The categories with notably large CVs correspond to the current and capital components of
utilities, while the outlier with a negative rescission coefficient results from an imprecisely estimated
coefficient on the capital portion of the budget for health and hospitals, which is quite small as a share
of total spending.
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the CVs. The results described above, as well as those in the following section, are
robust to directly controlling the level of real per capita income as well as controlling
for interactions between the deficit shocks and the share of each state’s revenue that
comes from taxation.24
5.3 Sources of Cross-State Variation in the Distribution of Rescis-
sions
I explore two plausibly important sources of variation in the composition of
rescissions across states. In results not shown, I find no evidence that the politi-
cal composition of state governments exerts a significant impact on the composition
of rescissions. The results in this instance were not sufficiently precise to be regarded
as strong evidence against the presence of such effects.
I also investigate the importance of public-sector union groups. In specifications
similar to the standard first-stage specifications, I find no evidence that the presence
of strong unions reduces the total quantity of rescissions enacted per dollar of deficit
shock (results not shown). The specifications presented below investigate the effects
of differences in the relative strength of the union groups within a state. Having
found that unions exert no impact on the quantity of rescissions, I investigate their
impact on the composition of the cuts enacted. The relative strength of the public-
sector worker organizations appears to be a significant determinant of cross-state
24The latter control is potentially important because states with weak budget rules also tend to rely
relatively extensively on taxation, making it possible that deficit shocks will have different implica-
tions for the positions of state budgets in the two groups of states.
37
variation in the composition of mid-year rescissions.
I first present the union results in Table 9 on a category-by-category basis. Since
I only have cross-sectional variation in the relative strength of public-sector unions,
the category-by-category analysis amounts to dividing states along union-strength
lines in addition to along budget-rule lines. This leaves a fairly small number of
states in each cell. Across all 5 spending categories, the results suggest that smaller
rescissions take place when the relevant worker group is relatively strong. While
consistent across the categories, however, the results are not statistically strong in any
one case. This pushes me towards specifications that stack the categories, yielding
observations at the state-by-category-by-year level. These specifications more fully
utilize the available variation in worker organizations, which occurs at the state-by-
category level.
Table 10 presents both first and second stage results for specifications that utilize
observations at the state-by-category-by-year level. Columns 1 and 2 report results
for the first stage on 4Outlays and on the interaction between the union indica-
tor and 4Outlays. In these columns I include the instruments involving both the
positive and negative deficit shock variables. I drop the negative deficit shock instru-
ments in Columns 5 and 6. Dropping these instruments leads the Kleibergen-Paap rk
Wald Statistic to increase from 4.41 to 8.34. This exceeds standard weak instrument
thresholds for tests of distortion to the size of the estimated confidence intervals in
the case of two endogenous regressors and two instruments. Results from Stock
and Yogo (2002) imply that the specifications should be run using Limited Informa-
tion Maximum Likelihood (LIML) to confirm that estimation using Two Stage Least
38
T
a
b
le
 9
: 
O
u
tl
a
y
 C
h
a
n
g
e
s 
a
n
d
 R
e
la
ti
ve
 U
n
io
n
 S
tr
e
n
g
th
 b
y
 S
p
e
n
d
in
g
 C
a
te
g
o
ry
 
  
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
H
ea
lt
h
 a
n
d
 
H
o
sp
it
al
s 
L
aw
 
E
n
fo
rc
em
en
t 
H
ig
h
w
ay
s 
O
th
er
 
∆
O
U
T
L
A
Y
S
 
0
.4
9
4
**
* 
0
.2
6
8
 
0
.0
7
7
8
 
0
.1
5
6
 
0
.7
4
9
* 
 
(0
.1
8
9
) 
(0
.1
7
1
) 
(0
.0
4
7
5
) 
(0
.1
2
2
) 
(0
.4
5
5
) 
∆
O
U
T
L
A
Y
S
*1
{
S
tr
o
n
g 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 U
n
io
n
}
 
-0
.3
5
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.2
2
8
) 
 
 
 
 
∆
O
U
T
L
A
Y
S
*1
{
S
tr
o
n
g 
H
ea
lt
h
 &
 H
o
sp
it
al
 U
n
io
n
}
 
-0
.2
8
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.1
9
2
) 
 
 
 
∆
O
U
T
L
A
Y
S
*1
{
S
tr
o
n
g 
P
o
lic
e 
U
n
io
n
}
 
 
 
-0
.1
2
8
* 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.0
7
6
7
) 
 
 
∆
O
U
T
L
A
Y
S
*1
{
S
tr
o
n
g 
H
ig
h
w
ay
 W
o
rk
er
 U
n
io
n
}
 
 
 
-0
.1
5
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.3
3
8
) 
 
∆
O
U
T
L
A
Y
S
*1
{
S
tr
o
n
g 
"O
th
er
" 
U
n
io
n
}
 
 
 
 
 
-0
.4
5
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0
.5
0
0
) 
S
ta
te
 F
ix
ed
 E
ff
ec
ts
 a
n
d
 Y
ea
r 
E
ff
ec
ts
? 
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
S
ta
te
 S
p
ec
if
ic
 T
re
n
d
s?
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
4
2
9
 
4
2
9
 
4
2
9
 
4
2
9
 
4
2
9
 
N
o
te
: 
**
*,
 *
*,
 a
n
d
 *
 i
n
d
ic
at
e 
st
at
is
ti
ca
l 
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
.0
1
, 
.0
5
, 
an
d
 .
1
0
 l
ev
el
s 
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
  
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
 e
rr
o
rs
, 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
 a
llo
w
in
g 
fo
r 
ar
b
it
ra
ry
 
co
rr
el
at
io
n
 a
t 
th
e 
st
at
e 
le
v
el
, 
ar
e 
in
 p
ar
en
th
es
es
 b
en
ea
th
 e
ac
h
 p
o
in
t 
es
ti
m
at
e.
  
T
h
e 
re
gr
es
si
o
n
s 
sh
o
w
n
 a
re
 t
h
e 
2
n
d
 s
ta
ge
 r
es
u
lt
s 
o
f 
T
w
o
-S
ta
ge
-L
ea
st
-
S
q
u
ar
es
 (
2
S
L
S
) 
es
ti
m
at
io
n
. 
 A
s 
in
 T
ab
le
 8
, 
th
e 
sa
m
p
le
 c
o
rr
es
p
o
n
d
s 
to
 t
h
e 
sa
m
p
le
 w
h
o
se
 s
u
m
m
ar
y 
st
at
is
ti
cs
 w
er
e 
p
re
se
n
te
d
 i
n
 T
ab
le
 6
 a
n
d
 t
h
a
t 
w
as
 u
se
d
 
in
 t
h
e 
fi
rs
t 
st
ag
e 
re
gr
es
si
o
n
 r
ep
o
rt
ed
 i
n
 c
o
lu
m
n
 4
 o
f 
T
ab
le
 7
. 
 T
h
e 
ex
cl
u
d
ed
 i
n
st
ru
m
en
ts
 a
re
 t
h
e 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 a
 w
ea
k
-b
u
d
ge
t-
ru
le
s 
in
d
ic
at
o
r 
an
d
 
th
e 
tw
o
 D
E
F
S
H
O
C
K
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
as
 w
el
l 
as
 i
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
w
ea
k
-b
u
d
ge
t-
ru
le
s 
in
d
ic
at
o
r,
 t
h
e 
tw
o
 D
E
F
S
H
O
C
K
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s,
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
re
le
v
an
t 
in
d
ic
at
o
r 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
a 
st
ro
n
g 
p
u
b
lic
 s
ec
to
r 
w
o
rk
er
 u
n
io
n
. 
 T
h
e 
m
ai
n
 e
ff
ec
t 
o
f 
∆
O
U
T
L
A
Y
S
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
 b
et
w
ee
n
 ∆
O
U
T
L
A
Y
S
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
u
n
io
n
 i
n
d
ic
at
o
r 
ar
e 
b
o
th
 t
re
at
ed
 a
s 
en
d
o
ge
n
o
u
s 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s.
  
T
h
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
 t
h
u
s 
in
v
o
lv
es
 s
ep
ar
at
e 
fi
rs
t 
st
ag
e 
re
gr
es
si
o
n
s 
fo
r 
ge
n
er
at
in
g 
p
re
d
ic
te
d
 v
al
u
es
 
o
f 
ea
ch
 o
f 
th
es
e 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s.
  
 T
h
e 
m
ai
n
 e
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o
 D
E
F
S
H
O
C
K
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s,
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 i
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
tw
o
 D
E
F
S
H
O
C
K
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
an
d
 t
h
e 
re
le
v
an
t 
in
d
ic
at
o
r 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
st
ro
n
g 
u
n
io
n
 w
er
e 
al
so
 i
n
cl
u
d
ed
 a
s 
co
n
tr
o
ls
. 
 T
h
e 
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
ar
e 
th
e 
re
al
 p
er
 c
ap
it
a 
sp
en
d
in
g 
q
u
an
ti
ti
es
 o
f 
th
e 
ca
te
go
ri
es
 n
am
ed
 a
t 
th
e 
to
p
 o
f 
ea
ch
 c
o
lu
m
n
. 
 T
h
es
e 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
w
er
e 
co
n
st
ru
ct
ed
 u
si
n
g 
d
at
a 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e 
A
S
S
G
F
 a
s 
p
re
v
io
u
sl
y 
d
es
cr
ib
ed
. 
 
T
h
e 
st
ro
n
g 
u
n
io
n
 i
n
d
ic
at
o
rs
 w
er
e 
co
n
st
ru
ct
ed
 u
si
n
g 
d
at
a 
o
n
 p
u
b
lic
 s
ec
to
r 
w
o
rk
er
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
1
9
8
7
 C
en
su
s 
o
f 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
ts
. 
 A
 s
ta
te
 i
s 
sa
id
 t
o
 
h
av
e 
a 
st
ro
n
g 
u
n
io
n
 f
o
r 
a 
p
ar
ti
cu
la
r 
ca
te
go
ry
 o
f 
sp
en
d
in
g 
w
h
en
 t
h
e 
fr
ac
ti
o
n
 o
f 
w
o
rk
er
s 
re
le
v
an
t 
to
 t
h
at
 c
at
eg
o
ry
 i
s 
la
rg
e 
re
la
ti
v
e 
to
 t
h
e 
fr
ac
ti
o
n
 o
f 
w
o
rk
er
s 
u
n
io
n
iz
ed
 i
n
 o
th
er
 c
at
eg
o
ri
es
. 
 
39
Squares (2SLS) does not result in downwardly biased standard errors.
Second stage estimates of the effect of strong unions on budget cuts appear in
columns 3,4, 7 and 8. The specifications in columns 3 and 4 are, respectively, 2SLS
and LIML specifications which take columns 1 and 2 as their first stages. The spec-
ifications in columns 7 and 8 are 2SLS and LIML specifications which take columns
5 and 6 as their first stages. The stacked results confirm what was observed in Table
8. Most mid-year budgetary rescissions occur in categories associated with relatively
weak public-sector worker organizations. Neither the point estimates nor the stan-
dard errors are affected by the various specification changes.
In results not shown, estimates suggest that the differential cuts associated with
weakly unionized workers occur primarily in the capital component of each cate-
gory’s budget. Mid-year budget cuts do not appear to have significant effects on
public-sector wages. As shown earlier in Table 6, capital expenditures bear a dis-
proportionate share of mid-year cuts, consistent with capital expenditures being the
most readily deferrable or reducible expenditures on relatively short notice.
Other results not shown suggest relatively strong effects of public-sector unions
for the period of fiscal stress running from 1988 to 1994 than that running from 2001
to 2004. This may reflect the fact that the strong-union designation is based on data
from 1987, making it more informative regarding the state of public worker organi-
zations during the earlier period. In other specifications, I have obtained results with
similar implications when specifying the union variables continuously. This includes
generating a continuous measure of the relative unionization rates as well as control-
ling separately for the fraction of workers unionized in each spending category’s
40
T
a
b
le
 1
0
: 
S
c
a
le
d
 O
u
tl
a
y
 C
h
a
n
g
e
s 
a
n
d
 R
e
la
ti
ve
 U
n
io
n
 S
tr
e
n
g
th
: 
 S
ta
c
k
ed
 S
p
e
n
d
in
g
 C
a
te
g
o
ri
e
s 
  
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(5
) 
(6
) 
(7
) 
(8
) 
 
∆
O
U
T
L
A
Y
S
 
∆
O
U
T
L
A
Y
S
 
S
p
en
d
in
g
 
S
p
en
d
in
g
 
∆
O
U
T
L
A
Y
S
 
∆
O
U
T
L
A
Y
S
 
S
p
en
d
in
g
 
S
p
en
d
in
g
 
 
 
*1
{
U
n
io
n
}
 
 
 
 
*1
{
U
n
io
n
}
 
 
 
∆
O
U
T
L
A
Y
S
 
 
 
1
.3
9
2
**
 
1
.3
9
6
**
 
 
 
1
.4
3
2
**
 
1
.4
3
2
**
 
 
 
 
(0
.6
2
0
) 
(0
.6
2
1
) 
 
 
(0
.6
4
5
) 
(0
.6
4
5
) 
∆
O
U
T
L
A
Y
S
*1
{
S
tr
o
n
g 
U
n
io
n
}
 
 
 
-0
.9
4
1
**
 
-0
.9
4
4
**
 
 
 
-0
.9
1
4
**
 
-0
.9
1
4
**
 
 
 
 
(0
.4
2
1
) 
(0
.4
2
2
) 
 
 
(0
.4
3
6
) 
(0
.4
3
6
) 
W
ea
k
 R
u
le
s*
D
E
F
S
H
O
C
K
 
0
.3
4
1
**
* 
0
.0
3
3
4
* 
 
 
0
.3
2
8
**
* 
0
.0
2
8
4
 
 
 
  
*1
{
D
E
F
S
H
O
C
K
 >
 0
}
 
(0
.0
6
1
4
) 
(0
.0
1
8
8
) 
 
 
(0
.0
5
9
5
) 
(0
.0
1
7
3
) 
 
 
W
ea
k
 R
u
le
s*
D
E
F
S
H
O
C
K
 
-0
.0
7
3
5
 
-0
.0
1
5
0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
*1
{
D
E
F
S
H
O
C
K
 <
 0
}
 
(0
.0
5
5
6
) 
(0
.0
2
8
1
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
ea
k
 R
u
le
s*
1
{
S
tr
o
n
g 
U
n
io
n
}
 
-0
.0
2
0
3
 
0
.2
3
6
**
* 
 
 
-0
.0
2
2
2
 
0
.2
3
5
**
* 
 
 
  
*D
E
F
S
H
O
C
K
*1
{
D
E
F
S
H
O
C
K
 >
 0
}
 
(0
.0
2
6
2
) 
(0
.0
5
8
2
) 
 
 
(0
.0
2
6
6
) 
(0
.0
5
8
2
) 
 
 
W
ea
k
 R
u
le
s*
1
{
S
tr
o
n
g 
U
n
io
n
}
 
0
.0
0
2
0
8
 
-0
.0
2
6
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
*D
E
F
S
H
O
C
K
*1
{
D
E
F
S
H
O
C
K
 <
 0
}
 
(0
.0
1
5
6
) 
(0
.0
2
3
1
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
ta
te
 F
ix
ed
 E
ff
ec
ts
 a
n
d
 Y
ea
r 
E
ff
ec
ts
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
S
ta
te
-S
p
ec
if
ic
 T
re
n
d
s 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
E
st
im
at
o
r 
 
 
2
S
L
S
 
L
IM
L
 
 
 
2
S
L
S
 
L
IM
L
 
K
le
ib
er
ge
n
-P
aa
p
 r
k
 W
al
d
 F
-S
ta
ti
st
ic
 
 
 
4
.4
1
 
4
.4
1
 
 
 
8
.3
4
 
8
.3
4
 
N
o
te
: 
**
*,
 *
*,
 a
n
d
 *
 i
n
d
ic
at
e 
st
at
is
ti
ca
l 
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
.0
1
, 
.0
5
, 
an
d
 .
1
0
 l
ev
el
s 
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
  
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
 e
rr
o
rs
, 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
 a
ll
o
w
in
g 
fo
r 
ar
b
it
ra
ry
 c
o
rr
el
at
io
n
 a
t 
th
e 
st
at
e 
le
v
el
, 
ar
e 
in
 
p
ar
en
th
es
es
 b
en
ea
th
 e
ac
h
 p
o
in
t 
es
ti
m
at
e.
  
T
h
e 
re
gr
es
si
o
n
s 
sh
o
w
n
 a
re
 t
h
e 
1
st
 a
n
d
 2
n
d
 s
ta
ge
 r
es
u
lt
s 
o
f 
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
l 
v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
sp
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
s 
u
si
n
g 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 a
 w
ea
k
-
b
u
d
ge
t-
ru
le
s 
in
d
ic
at
o
r 
an
d
 t
h
e 
D
E
F
S
H
O
C
K
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s,
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 i
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 a
 w
ea
k
-b
u
d
ge
t-
ru
le
s 
in
d
ic
at
o
r,
 t
h
e 
D
E
F
S
H
O
C
K
 v
ar
ib
le
s,
 a
n
d
 a
 s
tr
o
n
g
-u
n
io
n
 i
n
d
ic
at
o
r 
as
 
ex
cl
u
d
ed
 i
n
st
ru
m
en
ts
. 
 T
h
e 
m
ai
n
 e
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
tw
o
 D
E
F
S
H
O
C
K
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s,
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 i
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
tw
o
 D
E
F
S
H
O
C
K
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
an
d
 t
h
e 
in
d
ic
at
o
r 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
a 
st
ro
n
g 
u
n
io
n
 w
er
e 
al
so
 i
n
cl
u
d
ed
 a
s 
co
n
tr
o
ls
 (
re
su
lt
s 
n
o
t 
sh
o
w
n
).
  
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
ar
e 
at
 t
h
e 
sp
en
d
in
g 
ca
te
go
ry
-b
y-
st
at
e-
b
y-
ye
ar
 l
ev
el
, 
re
su
lt
in
g 
in
 2
1
4
5
 o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
(t
h
e 
4
2
9
 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e 
p
re
v
io
u
s 
ta
b
le
s 
ti
m
es
 5
 s
p
en
d
in
g 
ca
te
go
ri
es
).
  
T
h
e 
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 w
as
 c
o
n
st
ru
ct
ed
 t
h
ro
u
gh
 t
h
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
tr
an
sf
o
rm
at
io
n
 o
f 
re
al
 p
er
 c
ap
it
a 
sp
en
d
in
g
 i
n
 
ea
ch
 o
f 
th
e 
re
le
v
an
t 
sp
en
d
in
g 
ca
te
go
ri
es
 (
i.e
., 
in
 E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
, 
H
ea
lt
h
 &
 H
o
sp
it
al
s,
 H
ig
h
w
ay
s,
 L
aw
 E
n
fo
rc
em
en
t,
 a
n
d
 O
th
er
).
  
F
ir
st
, 
th
e 
re
al
 p
er
 c
ap
it
a 
sp
en
d
in
g 
am
o
u
n
ts
 w
er
e 
sc
al
ed
 
b
y 
th
e 
in
v
er
se
 o
f 
ea
ch
 c
at
eg
o
ry
's
 s
h
ar
e 
o
f 
T
o
ta
l 
N
o
n
-W
el
fa
re
 C
u
rr
en
t 
an
d
 C
ap
it
al
 s
p
en
d
in
g 
(w
it
h
 t
h
e 
av
er
ag
e 
ta
k
en
 a
t 
th
e 
ye
ar
-b
y-
n
at
io
n
 l
ev
el
).
  
S
ec
o
n
d
, 
th
e 
sp
en
d
in
g 
q
u
an
ti
ti
es
 
w
er
e 
d
em
ea
n
ed
 a
n
d
 d
e-
tr
en
d
ed
 a
t 
th
e 
st
at
e-
b
y-
ca
te
go
ry
 l
ev
el
. 
 A
n
 i
m
p
lic
at
io
n
 o
f 
th
is
 i
n
it
ia
l 
d
em
ea
n
in
g 
an
d
 d
e-
tr
en
d
in
g 
is
 t
h
at
 t
h
e 
p
re
se
n
te
d
 r
es
u
lt
s 
ar
e 
lit
tl
e 
ch
an
ge
d
 b
y 
th
e 
in
cl
u
si
o
n
 o
r 
ex
cl
u
si
o
n
 o
f 
ye
ar
 e
ff
ec
ts
, 
st
at
e 
fi
xe
d
 e
ff
ec
ts
, 
an
d
 s
ta
te
-s
p
ec
if
ic
 t
re
n
d
s.
  
C
o
lu
m
n
s 
1
 a
n
d
 2
 p
re
se
n
t 
th
e 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 o
n
 t
h
e 
ex
cl
u
d
ed
 i
n
st
ru
m
en
ts
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
tw
o
 f
ir
st
 s
ta
ge
 
re
gr
es
si
o
n
s 
p
re
ce
d
in
g 
th
e 
se
co
n
d
 s
ta
ge
 e
st
im
at
es
 t
h
at
 a
p
p
ea
r 
in
 c
o
lu
m
n
s 
3
 a
n
d
 4
. 
 T
h
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
 i
n
 c
o
lu
m
n
 3
 w
as
 e
st
im
at
ed
 u
si
n
g 
T
w
o
-S
ta
ge
-L
ea
st
-S
q
u
ar
es
 (
2
S
L
S
).
  
T
h
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
 i
n
 c
o
lu
m
n
 4
 i
s 
eq
u
iv
al
en
t 
to
 c
o
lu
m
n
 3
, 
b
u
t 
es
ti
m
at
ed
 u
si
n
g 
L
im
it
ed
 I
n
fo
rm
at
io
n
 M
ax
im
u
m
 L
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
 (
L
IM
L
).
  
T
h
e 
sp
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
s 
in
 c
o
lu
m
n
s 
5
-8
 a
re
 e
q
u
iv
al
en
t 
to
 
th
o
se
 i
n
 c
o
lu
m
n
s 
1
-4
, 
b
u
t 
w
it
h
 t
h
e 
se
t 
o
f 
ex
cl
u
d
ed
 i
n
st
ru
m
en
ts
 r
es
tr
ic
te
d
 t
o
 i
n
cl
u
d
e 
th
e 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
s 
in
v
o
lv
in
g 
p
o
si
ti
v
e 
d
ef
ic
it
 s
h
o
ck
s.
 
 
41
“own” and “all other” worker categories.
The union result fades out in the subsequent fiscal year. While the results are
insufficiently precise to draw strong conclusions, this is consistent with public unions
having differential influence over the allocation of mid-year rescissions to already
enacted budgets than over spending as determined in the subsequent appropriations
cycle. In many states, the governor is authorized to dictate rescissions unilaterally
when revenues come in lower than projected. Appropriations, on the other hand,
must be approved by state legislatures. The results are thus consistent with models
in which interest groups can more effectively lobby in the face of a single, executive
actor than in the face of relatively dispersed power as under a legislature.
6 Conclusion
The above analysis draws out a variety of facts regarding the behavior of state
governments over the course of the business cycle. Economic downturns are asso-
ciated with reductions in discretionary spending on infrastructure, education, other
state government services, and transfers to local governments. These fluctuations
tend to be most severe in states that utilize relatively volatile revenue bases and
budget over relatively brief windows.
Pro-cyclical spending reflects the reality of complying with balanced budget re-
quirements during recessions after failing to save during expansions. Confronted
with the need to make cuts, states appear to proceed so as to limit disruptions to
public-service provision. This was reflected in the disproportionate share of cuts
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borne by capital expenditures and by budgetary categories that are likely to contain
deferrable projects. Finally, I find evidence that interest groups can play an influ-
ential role in the budget-cutting process; public-sector unions, in particular, appear
adept at avoiding mid-year rescissions.
The pro-cyclicality of discretionary spending almost certainly comes with sig-
nificant costs. Conducting capital projects during expansions will cost more than
conducting them during recessions (due to high wages and other input costs) and
may contribute to the severity of the business cycle. Cyclical spending also implies
service flows that are more volatile than necessary. An interesting direction for fu-
ture work will be to estimate the effect of these fluctuations on targeted outcomes,
in particular outcomes related to safety-net programs and education.25 Spending
reductions driven by differences in the volatility of state revenue bases may be an
attractive source of variation for studying the effects of these cyclical changes.
The relatively extreme volatility of spending in states that rely extensively on taxa-
tion has potentially interesting distributional implications. In these states, additional
pro-cyclicality in spending comes with additional counter-cyclicality in revenue col-
lections. On net, these countervailing forces have an ambiguous implication for the
volatility of the state’s economy. However, spending and tax collections can affect
very different groups of people. Counter-cyclical revenue collections will most di-
rectly affect high income tax payers while volatile expenditures will most directly
affect public workers and the beneficiaries of public services. Investigation of how
25The observed cyclical patterns will affect all levels of education, as changes in state grants to
localities affect primary and secondary education while state governments’ direct expenditures affect
higher education.
43
these groups are affected by differences in the volatility to which they are exposed
(e.g., in terms of their consumption over the business cycle), may be an interesting
direction for future work.
A final question of interest, to the extent to which pro-cyclical spending is costly,
is why states do not take more steps to avoid it. Standard explanations look to
political factors (e.g., upcoming elections) that may lead politicians to discount the
costs of future deficits (or volatility) in exchange for short-run political gain. The
extent to which fiscal institutions mitigate or exacerbate these political tendencies
has clear importance. Of equal importance, but more difficult to ascertain, are the
extent to (and channels through) which such institutions influence the efficiency with
which government services are produced.
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